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Farmer v. State, 133 Nev. Adv. Op. 86 (Nov. 16, 2017)1
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: JOINDER APPEAL
Summary
The Nevada Supreme Court determined that (1) Under NRS 173.115(2), separate
offenses may be joined against a defendant when they are committed as parts of a common
scheme where the defendant’s separate crimes share features idiosyncratic in character;
and (2) under NRS 174.165(1), joinder is proper in situations where a defendant commits
similar offenses in separate instances.
Background
Over a two-month period in 2008, five female patients treated at Centennial Hills
Hospital by certified nursing assistant (CNA), Steven Farmer, were sexually assaulted.
After one victim reported her incident to the hospital and police, an investigation ensued.
After law enforcement issued a media release, the other four victims came forward,
initiating individual actions against Farmer.
At trial, each of the individual actions became one, after the lower court granted the
State’s motion to join the five victims’ claims. Together, the victims alleged that Farmer
touched them in inappropriate sexual manners. Also, other witnesses, including a witness
offered by the defense, testified about Farmer's unusual behavior, corroborating portions
of the victims' testimonies. Ultimately, Farmer was convicted by a jury of four counts of
sexual assault, eight counts of open or gross lewdness, and one count of indecent exposure.
Farmer was sentenced to three consecutive life terms of imprisonment with the possibility
of parole after ten years, as well as other concurrent sentences. Farmer appealed.
Discussion
II.
A.
On appeal, Farmer's main contention was that the trial court abused its discretion
by granting the State's motion to join his offenses because precedent suggested that only
those offenses considered as pre-planned steps up the ladder toward a specific,
predetermined goal could be joined. Farmer argued that the reasoning behind the lower
court's decision—that his offenses were parts of a common scheme or plan—was erroneous
because the State did not show that each offense was an integral part of an overarching
criminal enterprise. The State countered Farmer’s arguments by pointing to similarities
between his five offenses, claiming that the similarities demonstrated that the offenses were
committed pursuant to design as opposed to being crimes of opportunity.
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B.
Looking into the language of NRS 173.115(2) 2 , which provides that separate
offenses may be joined if they are based on two or more acts or transactions connected
together or constituting parts of a common scheme or plan, the Court agreed with the State
that Farmer’s offenses could be joined. The Court explained that the statute’s words
"scheme" and "plan," have different implications regarding theories of joinder. Instead of
reading the statue’s "parts of a common scheme or plan" language as one phrase with one
meaning, the Court concluded that the statue permits joinder if the offenses are "parts of a
common scheme" or "parts of a common plan." The Court noted that the phrases were not
synonymous, describing a common plan as “crimes related to one another for the purpose
of accomplishing a particular goal,” and a common scheme as “crimes that share features
idiosyncratic in character.”3
C.
Before categorizing Farmer’s multiple offenses as parts of a common scheme, the
Court explained that it looks to certain factors to determine whether a common scheme
exists. The features include: (1) degree of similarity of offenses4; (2) degree of similarity
of victims5; (3) temporal proximity6; (4) physical proximity7; (5) number of victims8; and
(6) other context-specific features9.
Thereafter, the Court found little difficulty in concluding that Farmer's offenses
were adequately shown to have been parts of a common scheme. The Court explained that
because each of Farmer’s offenses occurred within the span of several weeks, at Centennial
Hills Hospital, and the victims were markedly similar in that each was in a vulnerable state
having been taken to the hospital by ambulance after a traumatic medical episode, the
cumulative effect of Farmer’s offenses constituted parts of a common scheme.
Of particular relevance to the Court was that the offenses were not based on one or
two incidents widely separated in time, but more so the allegations of five unrelated victims
who claimed that Farmer touched them sexually while suggesting, or outright stating, that
the touching was a part of their medical care. The Court held that Farmer used his position
as a CNA to access unusually vulnerable victims and exploit them under the guise of
providing medical care, because Farmer’s offenses involved too many similar factors when
viewed together.
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D.
Farmer then argued that according to NRS 174.165(1), he should have been granted
five separate trials, and joinder was fundamentally unfair. NRS 174.165(1) states that the
Court may grant separate trials if joinder is prejudicial against the defendant. 10 Farmer
argued that joinder of his victims’ claims created too great a risk that the jury would
improperly infer that he had a propensity to commit the sexual acts without considering
each charge separately. The Court held that the lower court’s joinder was not unfair,
because the State did not make a propensity argument. The State merely argued that the
number of victims, and the similarity of their stories, was evidence that the offenses
occurred as claimed.
III.
Also, on appeal, Farmer alleged that his rights under Nevada and federal law were
violated before trial, during trial, and at sentencing.
A.
First, Farmer argued that his Sixth Amendment right to a fair and speedy trial was
violated. However, the Court held that because the defense delayed the trial, and Farmer
waived his speedy trial right, his Sixth Amendment right was not violated.
B.
Second, Farmer argued that because the trial court did not allow him to crossexamine the victims and their nurses, his Confrontation Clause rights were violated. The
Confrontation Clause imposes reasonable limits on cross-examination based on concerns
about harassment, prejudice, confusion of the issues, the witness's safety, or interrogation
that is repetitive or only marginally relevant. 11 The Court held that because the
Confrontation Clause guarantees an opportunity for effective cross-examination, an
opportunity that was apparent to Farmer, his Confrontation Clause rights were not violated.
C.
Third, Farmer argued that the trial court abused its discretion in making several
evidentiary decisions. The Court held Farmer’s claims to be minuscule and dismissed each
of them.
D.
Fourth, Farmer argued that the prosecutor committed numerous instances of
misconduct during his trial at the lower court. However, the Court highlighted that Farmer
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“only fairly and contemporaneously objected to one.” 12 The Court regarded Farmer’s
claims as unpreserved misconduct and concluded that Farmer failed to demonstrate plain
error that affected his substantial rights.
E.
Last, Farmer argued that his sentence constituted cruel and unusual punishment
because his five offenses caused substantial harm. The Court held that cumulative error did
not warrant Farmer relief.
Conclusion
The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed the lower court’s decision to join five separate
sexual offenses, committed by Steven Farmer, against woman he encountered in his
position as a Certified Nursing Assistant. Steven Farmer remains guilty of four counts of
sexual assault, eight counts of open or gross lewdness, and one count of indecent exposure.
Dissent
The dissent argued against these conclusions, claiming that joinder under NRS
173.115(2) was invalid because the legislature did not intend to allow for joinder based on
the similarity of offenses, and that if it wanted to, it could have expressly done so as
provided for in the federal rules. The dissent further clarified that the Court should not have
expanded the types of offenses that are joined by case law by a strained reading of
“common scheme.”
The dissent also reasoned that even if joinder were not improper, the Court should
have ordered separate trials under NRS 174.165 based on prejudicial joinder. The dissent
explained that the evidence for the charges involving each of the five victims was weak
and presented a close call of guilt, which increased the danger that the jury would unfairly
accumulate it. The dissent concluded that the majority’s allowance of joinder against
Farmer was fundamentally unfair and warrants reversal and remand for separate trials.
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